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REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE
TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 21 February 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward to you the memorandum issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 18 February 1994 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 64 and 65 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/49/50.

ANNEX

Memorandum issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 18 February 1994

TRUE PICTURE OF PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM FROM PHWRS IN SOUTH KOREA

It is a worldwide-known fact that the successive rulers in south Korea have long carried forward their clandestine programme for the development of nuclear weapons under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued its memorandum early last year, disclosing south Korea's nuclear weapons development programme.

Many governments, political parties, public organizations and the world community at large have expressed great concern over the south Korean authorities' machinations for nuclear weapons development and demanded their immediate discontinuation. This notwithstanding, the south Korean authorities have refused to comply with this demand and stepped up their nuclear weapons development at accelerated pace.

In connection with another revelation of the fact that the south Korean authorities have recently increased plutonium output from their pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) for the development of nuclear weapons, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is issuing this memorandum, considering it necessary to disclose the true picture thereof.

I. The South Korean Authorities' Nuclear Weapons Development Policy and Introduction of PHWR

South Korea's nuclear weapons development policy was shaped in the early 1970s.

The 1960s witnessed a rapid collapse of the imperialists' colonial system in different parts of the world, that gave way to a chain of the declaration of independence by countries under the colonial domination. In the 1970s, the suzerain states moved toward withdrawing their troops from their former colonies.

Critically ill at ease over these moves, the former dictator Park Chung Hee tried to find a way out in developing nuclear weapons.

A former aide close to the "Chongwadae" testified that Park Chung Hee "concluded that the last resort for self-reliant national defence capability is the acquisition of nuclear weapons." (South Korean monthly magazine Shin Dong-a, April issue of 1989).

Recalling this period, a south Korean newspaper reported that "with all testimonies pieced together, Park Chung Hee seemed to have taken a 'shortcut' toward the acquisition of

nuclear weapons by the mid-1970s." (South Korean newspaper Chungang Ilbo, August 6, 1992)

As Park Chung Hee committed himself to the nuclear development policy, his primary preoccupation was to obtain access to the nuclear explosive substances and introduce the PHWR to this end.

The south Korean monthly magazine Wolgan Choson in its August issue of 1988 commented that "Park Chung Hee forcefully suppressed the anti-PHWR voice within his 'government' and ordered chairman Moon Choong Shik of the 'Korea Electric Power Corporation' (KEPOC) to resolutely push forward the introduction of the PHWR. This seemed to reflect his preoccupation with the nuclear arms development".

The same magazine in its October issue of 1991 wrote that "a person, once deeply engaged in the nuclear development programme, admitted that the introduction of the Wolsong PHWR from Canada was aimed at manufacturing nuclear weapons."

Even a physicist who remembers the PHWR introduction asserted that "the PHWR introduction is apparently related to the nuclear weapons development." (South Korean monthly magazine Shin Dong-a, April issue of 1989). South Korea embarked on a pilot-production of nuclear weapons through PHWR as early as in the late 1970s. These attempts by south Korea to develop nuclear weapons escalated during the years of the Chun Doo Hwan "regime".

On December 19, 1980, Chun Doo Hwan took the "measure of merging and dissolving the 'government'-subsidized agencies", a camouflage to feign the abandonment of nuclear weapons development scheme, but in fact "maximized their research capability." (South Korean Yonhap yearbook, 1981 edition)

In September 1983, Lee Ki Baek, the then "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the 'ROK' Army", submitted his "verbal report on the nuclear policy" of south Korea to Chun Doo Hwan, and this was the occasion for the evolution of the "secretly planned strategy for nuclear arms option," which has since been vigorously promoted". (South Korean monthly magazine Wolgan Choson, October issue of 1991)

Under the cloak of the "localization of nuclear fuel," the Chun Doo Hwan military "regime" succeeded in developing the PHWR nuclear fuel in 1986 and completed its experimental facilities for processing the PHWR nuclear fuel in 1987. This process has enabled the "regime" to move toward the goal of an independent capability of producing the total amount of nuclear fuel needed for the Wolsong PHWR and at the same time toward the stage of perfecting the technology of reprocessing the spent fuel.

The Roh Tae Woo military "regime" stepped into a full-scale stage of achieving a greater practicability of the industrial foundation of its nuclear weapons development programme by completing this foundation.

Stressing the need to "actively meet the fast-changing situation", Roh Tae Woo had the "Taedok Declaration" adopted pledging to complete by 1992 the project of the "Taedok science town", general headquarters of the nuclear weapons development programme, 4 or 5 years ahead of schedule, and on November 27, 1992 he officiated at the dedication ceremony of the town project. (South Korean Dong-a yearbook, 1991 edition, NBC television, November 27, 1992)

Throughout the process of their nuclear weapons development, the present south Korean authorities attempted to divert the world public attention from their telltale nuclear arms programme under the cloak of the light water reactors (LWR) system. In face of the

mounting international public opinion against south Korea's increasing moves towards nuclear weapons development. Kim Young Sam tried to whitewash such moves, saying that they "have no intention at all to go ahead with any independent nuclear weapons development programme". (South Korean radio no. 1, November 14, 1993)

South Korean authorities' decision to introduce the PHWR was "motivated by the analysis which indicates a higher purity of plutonium from the reprocessed natural uranium as compared with the spent enriched uranium." (South Korean monthly magazine Wolgan Choson, April issue of 1992)

The south Korean monthly magazine Wolgan Choson in its November issue of 1989 quoted the chairman of south Korea's non-governmental "council for atomic power development and safety" as saying in the early 1970s that "the Canadian deuterium-uranium (CANDU)-type PHWR is fuelled by natural uranium, which we can supply on our own".

The PHWR introduction is also aimed at circumventing the supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

A south Korean physicist who remembers the period of the PHWR introduction confessed that "the IAEA's supervision is almost difficult, because the PHWR leaves room for a random fuel discharge." (South Korean monthly magazine Shin Dong-a, April issue of 1989)

As seen in the above, the Wolsong PHWR is a pile geared to plutonium production which the south Korean authorities have commissioned into operation in pursuit of their policy intention to develop nuclear weapons.

II. The Stockpiling of Plutonium through the PHWR and Completion of System for the Full-scale Nuclear Weapons Development

The Wolsong PHWR plays a pivotal role in the south Korean authorities' nuclear weapons development programme.

Under a south Korean-Canadian December 1974 contract, the Wolsong PHWR project began in January 1976 and went into operation in April 1983.

At present, south Korea has the Wolsong PHWR, the multi- purpose research reactors (K-NRR) and post irradiation test facilities in operation as an integral centre of the plutonium production.

The amount of nuclear material from a 1,000 mwe PHWR after one year operation is enough to manufacture around 50 atomic bombs of Nagasaki type.

Therefore, it follows that the 678.7 mwe PHWR operating in south Korea since 1983 has by now produced potential plutonium enough to manufacture over 370 atomic bombs.

The U.S. newspaper International Herald Tribune on November 2, 1993 said that south Korea is speeding up its ambitious nuclear programme under IAEA "safeguards," and further wrote that "experts estimate that its accumulated spent fuel would yield about 10 tons of plutonium if reprocessed. This stockpile of potential plutonium will increase to an estimated 24 tons by the year 2,000."

This was pointed out also by the Japanese magazine Sekai in its December issue of 1992, which reported that south Korea has stockpiled about 10 tons of plutonium extracted from the spent fuel.

Quite obvious is how much the stockpile of plutonium will bulk up, when another PHWR now under construction is commissioned into operation.

South Korea is speeding up its projects to build more PHWRs in an effort to extract more plutonium under the pretext of reprocessing 300 tons of spent fuel annually discharged from eight LWRs currently in operation plus 1,140 tons of spent fuel contained in underwater storage to be recycled back into these PHWRs.

Commenting on this, south Korean newspaper Hangyore Sinmun reported on March 15, 1990 that the south Korean authorities were planning to recycle the LWR spent fuel into low-enriched PHWR fuel blended with other uranium waste, a move "implicative of their military consideration reflected by their intention to build more PHWR power plants that allow an easier extraction of plutonium."

Peter Hayes, an anti-nuclear activist, wrote in his essay, entitled "the Republic of Korea and the nuclear issue," that "it is evident that the south Koreans have not abandoned the idea of reprocessing their spent fuel. In October, 1989, south Korea began informal discussions to organize a trilateral arrangement involving south Korea, the United States, and Canada, whereby coprocessing would be established in south Korea.

Also in October, 1989 an IAEA seminar in Vienna was told by a KEPCO official that south Korea wants to install more PHWRs. A south Korean official added at the same meeting that south Korea would like to reprocess LWR spent fuel for recycling plutonium back into these PHWRs."

The point at issue is that the spent nuclear fuel from the PHWR is diverted directly into manufacturing nuclear weapons after its conversion into plutonium through the undisclosed reprocessing facility at the "Taedok science town."

III. The PHWRs Must be Replaced by the LWRs.

The south Korean authorities have given the United States carte blanche to deploy numerous nuclear weapons in south Korea and meanwhile, on their part, actively pushed ahead with their own nuclear weapons development programme, and they are planning these days to introduce even "patriot"missiles.

This graphically testifies to a sheer incongruity of their words and deeds, allegedly devoted to the implementation of the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula".

Now, south Korea is practically moving toward invalidating the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula".

In this regard, an American scholar Selig S. Harrison wrote in his comment that "criticism of the agreement has intensified in south Korea since Mr. Roh left office. One of the key advisers to President Kim Young Sam, Chung Jey Moon, Chairman of the 'National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee' has called for a review of the 1991 agreement. "'We know that we could generate nuclear power at a lower cost if we have

reprocessing facilities,' Mr. Chung said last May, 'and we cannot continue to depend on foreign countries for nuclear fuel.'" (U.S. newspaper International Herald Tribune, November 2, 1993)

The increasingly undisguised efforts on the part of the south Korean authorities to invalidate the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" have further intensified recently, simultaneously with the on-going ruckus over the DPRK's so-called "suspected nuclear programme".

South Korea's former "Minister of National Unification" Lee Se Ghee said in April 1993 that "the 'North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization' has been invalidated in principle," and went the length of insisting that "it is high time we have to acquire nuclear weapons capability, and the 'National Assembly' should raise voice calling for this." (South Korean newspaper Dong-a Ilbo, April 11, 1993)

South Korean "NBC television" reported on October 9, 1993 that some observers speculated that Kim Young Sam called a "security-related Ministers" meeting, unusually attended by the "Minister of Science and Technology," and the meeting discussed matters related to the "acquisition of nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities" and to the "review of the 'Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.'"

It has become a stark fact that the persistent dustup by the south Korean authorities over the DPRK's so-called "suspected nuclear programme" is, after all, intended to justify their attempts to develop nuclear weapons.

Commenting on this, the Romanian weekly Europa in its edition no. 152 disclosed that "the south Korean authorities' kickup over the north's 'suspected nuclear programme' is part of their propaganda offensive to legalize their own nuclear weapons development."

The Canada-based overseas Koreans' newspaper New Korea Times commented on October 23, 1993 that "particularly, the voice of the new right-wing forces in south Korea calling for the possession of nuclear weapons was high in intensity and the opposition response was no less tough. As if reflecting such pros and cons, south Korea's nuclear independence turned out to be a favorite topic in the 'national assembly' as well".

These facts alone suffice to show that the south Korean authorities are dashing headlong toward nuclear weapons development, unconcerned with the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," which they have now rendered worthless.

The south Korean authorities must renounce their "nuclear weapons development policy" for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, remove the nuclear materials they have already produced or brought from other countries, and take urgent measures either to dismantle their PHWRs both in operation and under construction or to replace them with LWRs.